Civil-Military Relatins under Strain

Despite its overblown title, the article “Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations” by University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Richard H. Kohn in the most recent World Affairs journal provides an excellent exploration of four unavoidable and exceptional stressors building on the civil-military relationship, and how these pressures would affect potential Democract and Republican administrations.

While civil-military relations at the beginning of the Republic involved real fears of a coup, for the last two centuries the concern has revolved around relative influence: can the politicians (often divided among themselves) really “control” the military? Can the generals and admirals secure the necessary resources and autonomy to accomplish the government’s purposes with minimal loss of blood and treasure? …

Four problems, in particular, will intensify the normal friction: the endgame in Iraq, unsustainable military budgets, the mismatch between twenty-first century threats and a Cold War military establishment, and social issues, gays in the military being the most incendiary.

All Wars Must End

The Smart Way Out of a Foolish War by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Washington Post, 30 March 2008.

The case for U.S. disengagement from combat is compelling in its own right. But it must be matched by a comprehensive political and diplomatic effort to mitigate the destabilizing regional consequences of a war that the outgoing Bush administration started deliberately, justified demagogically and waged badly. (I write, of course, as a Democrat; while I prefer Sen. Barack Obama, I speak here for myself.)

The contrast between the Democratic argument for ending the war and the Republican argument for continuing is sharp and dramatic. The case for terminating the war is based on its prohibitive and tangible costs, while the case for “staying the course” draws heavily on shadowy fears of the unknown and relies on worst-case scenarios. President Bush’s and Sen. John McCain’s forecasts of regional catastrophe are quite reminiscent of the predictions of “falling dominoes” that were used to justify continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Neither has provided any real evidence that ending the war would mean disaster, but their fear-mongering makes prolonging it easier…

How Not to End the War by Max Boot, Washington Post, 31 March 2008.

Why am I not reassured by Zbigniew Brzezinski’s breezy assurance in Sunday’s Outlook section that “forecasts of regional catastrophe” after an American pullout from Iraq are as overblown as similar predictions made prior to our pullout from South Vietnam? Perhaps because the fall of Saigon in 1975 really was a catastrophe. Another domino fell at virtually the same time — Cambodia.

Sadr Offers Conditions for Cease-Fire

Sadr looks like he’s ready to make a deal with the GOI, pitching minor government compormises to conclude the most recent outbreak of Shia-Shia violence in the south (as well, perhaps, as renewed attacks on Baghdad).  A good move for both sides, as casting himself as the victorious peacemaker would help Sadr consolidate whatever gains he had made during the recent violence to regain control of JAM.  The GOI on the other hand has the opportunity to broker a relatively cheap exchange for a peace that they would otherwise not be able to enforce, and encourage further movement by Sadr into the political contest.  If this or a similar deal is made, efforts to continue political reintegration of Sadr and JAM forces will be key to restoring some sense of stability (whatever it may be) and to fill the festering power gap in the South.

Back from Iraq

…posting to resume soon…

Modernizing Foreign Assistance

The Center for Global Development presents an essay: In this new essay, adapted from a forthcoming CGD book The White House and the World: A Global Development Agenda for the Next U.S. President, CGD senior fellow Steve Radelet analyses the recent increases in funding and new organizational changes such as the MCC, PEPFAR, the growing role of the Department of Defense, and the F process. He then proposes a five-point strategy for modernizing U.S. foreign assistance: develop a National Foreign Assistance Strategy; create a new cabinet-level department for development policy; rewrite the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act; place a higher priority on multilateral assistance channels; and increase the quantity and improve the allocation of funding.

I haven’t read this yet, although I’ve waded through most of the development reform essays of the past few years.  Comments to follow.

Legal Corner

In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by a friend in law school, who occassionally submits excellent stand-alone quotes from current readings)

Heller v. DC: Showdown at SCOTUS Corral

The United States Supreme Court has decided only one significant case involving the Second Amendment, and that was almost 70 years ago. Writes Nelson Lund in a useful summary of the various positions on the Heller case for Heritage. Next week, the Court will return to the issue when it hears arguments in District of Columbia v. Heller. This is a test case brought by a D.C. special police officer who carries a gun while on duty. Under D.C.’s extremely restrictive gun control laws, he is forbidden to keep a handgun, or an operable rifle or shotgun, in his home.

Hattip: Volokh Conspiracy, which also directed folks to the Washington Post poll on gun control (helpful, since I pretty much just live and breathe Iraq out here – It’s embarrassing) which shows (a) a strong national trend toward an individual right, (b) a pretty even split on gun control, although the pro seem more passionate, and (c) a surprisingly high number of people in WashDC supporting the gun ban despite shopping at what is widely known as “The UnSafeway”. Volokh inspired me to go to the NYTimes to see what they had to say, which includes a story on a “rift” within the Administration about who is more in support of the Second Amendment (which Volokh has also linked to, so there you go).

The Chinese “Supercycle”

The Economist presents an interesting series on China this week:

• The new colonialists. China’s hunger for natural resources is causing more problems at home than abroad. [hint: mostly deals with pollution rather than property rights, this time]
   
• A ravenous dragon. China’s hunger for natural resources has set off a global commodity boom. Developed countries worry about being left high and dry, but the biggest effects will be felt in China itself
   
• Where is everybody? Manufacturers struggle in southern China’s industrial belt.

U.S. Tongue-Ties Self In Talking To World

Matthew C. Armstrong (MountainRunner) makes one of the best calls for coherent restructuring of public diplomacy - one that does no stoop to the typical pattern of anointing czars, establishing new agencies, or moving around flow charts. 

Sixty years ago, the elements of America’s national power – diplomacy, information, military, and economics, or DIME – were retooled to meet an emerging threat with the National Security Act of 1947 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. Then as it is today, the U.S. was engaged in a war of ideas and perceptions both globally and domestically, however the importance and impact of Smith-Mundt is ignored despite its influence, often negative, on every aspect of America’s informational arsenal. … Just as good tactics cannot overcome a bad strategy, reorganization cannot solve systemic problems and limits. Now is the time to retool for the current and future fight. Our economic and physical security depends on it.

Armstrong additionally raises cites the comment by Murrow (“the only chief of the United States Information Agency who regularly attended National Security Council meetings”) that public diplomacy must not only be in on the “crash landings” but also at the take-offs. Interestingly (but not mentioned here), under Eisenhower, the NSC itself had been constructed with a large psyops component that while never fully integrated went well beyond our now limited use of the term.  But then, Eisenhower’s NSC was bifurcated to address coordination on both the policy planning and implementation sides, a structure which has not been repeated.

Marc Lynch (Abu Aardvark) responds to Armstrong here.

More Unintended Consequences

I’d rather be Hanged for a Sheep than a Lamb: The Unintended Consequences of ‘Three-Strikes’ Laws, Radha Iyengar, NBER Working Paper No. 13784 (February 2008)
Strong sentences are common “tough on crime” tool used to reduce the incentives for individuals to participate in criminal activity. However, the design of such policies often ignores other margins along which individuals interested in participating in crime may adjust. I use California’s Three Strikes law to identify several effects of a large increase in the penalty for a broad set of crimes. Using criminal records data, I estimate that Three Strikes reduced participation in criminal activity by 20 percent for second-strike eligible offenders and a 28 percent decline for third-strike eligible offenders. However, I find two unintended consequences of the law. First, because Three Strikes flattened the penalty gradient with respect to severity, criminals were more likely to commit more violent crimes. Among third-strike eligible offenders, the probability of committing violent crimes increased by 9 percentage points. Second, because California’s law was more harsh than the laws of other nearby states, Three Strikes had a “beggar-thy-neighbor” effect increasing the migration of criminals with second and third-strike eligibility to commit crimes in neighboring states. The high cost of incarceration combined with the high cost of violent crime relative to non-violent crime implies that Three Strikes may not be a cost-effective means of reducing crime.

(hat tip: The Volokh Conspiracy)